

# Finland

## 95. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 16, 1969.

### SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Ambassador Peterson

The Ambassador has been in Washington since last week for a series of briefings, and plans to return to Hastings, Nebraska, on Saturday; he will embark for Finland on June 24.<sup>2</sup>

### *Background*

Finland does not try to play a major role in international affairs, mainly because of its preoccupation with ensuring stable relations with the USSR, which retains certain military intervention rights under a 1948 treaty.<sup>3</sup> Helsinki's main objective is to promote international acceptance of its role as a neutral. Nevertheless, from time to time the Finns have taken initiatives in European affairs, generally to support Soviet proposals. The recent Finnish proposals (May 6) to host a European Security Conference is an example of an attempt to show support for the USSR but to cast Finnish support in a neutral mode.

Because of its dependence on trade the Finns are fairly active in Nordic affairs. They have joined the OECD, and in recent years have been more active in the UN. Finland is currently a member of the Security Council. It has been forced to remain outside most European organizations, and one of its important problems is how to protect its exports if other members of the European Free Trade Area eventually join the Common Market.

Another aspect of Finnish efforts to ward off potential Soviet pressures was the re-entry of the Finnish Communists into the governing

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 673, Country Files—Europe, Finland, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick V.E. Peterson was appointed Ambassador to Finland on May 1. He presented his credentials on July 14. No record of the President's conversation with Peterson has been found. Peterson's state of residency was Nebraska.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, see 48 UNTS 149.

coalition. The Social Democrats had been anathema to the USSR but polled a majority in 1966, and in order to form a government acceptable to the USSR invited the Communists into the coalition. The Communists have played no major role however; in the last few months, the Party split at its Congress, with a moderate faction taking power, provoking a walk-out of the conservative faction. This dispute is still unresolved, but Moscow has advised the conservatives to patch up the dispute.

The main force in Finnish politics remains the 69 year old President Urho Kekkonen who is serving his third six year term. He has proved an adroit manipulator, managing to satisfy the Soviets without compromising Finnish independence. He frequently meets with the Soviet leaders, and apparently has their confidence.

*Talking Points*

Should you discuss substance with the Ambassador, you may wish to mention the following:

- you are interested in the latest Finnish initiative in offering to host a European Security Conference;

- you assume that the Finns stepped out in front on this issue to keep from being pressured into a more pro-Soviet proposal;

- thus, we want to be careful not to rebuff the Finns (the Finns have told us privately they expect no early movement on their proposal);

- our approach, however, was worked out at the recent NATO meeting to the effect that we should explore concrete issues before moving into a large conference;

- NATO is currently consulting on European security and examining specific issues that might be worth discussing with the USSR;

- meanwhile, we have strong doubts that a conference of thirty nations would be of any value.

In view of the close contacts between Finland and the USSR, you may also wish to review with the Ambassador the status of SALT discussions and the NPT ratification.

## 96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 17, 1969, 1424Z.

157690. Subj: Secretary's Conversation with Finnish Foreign Minister Sept 12. Ref: Helsinki 946.<sup>2</sup> Following summary FYI only and Noform. It is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.

1. After Finnish Ambassador's dinner Sept 12 honoring Secretary and Foreign Minister Karjalainen, they retired to library for informal conversation. Ambassador and small group of Foreign Ministry and Dept officers also present.

2. Main topics discussed were:

(a) SALT: Secretary said we are thinking of proposing Helsinki as one of possible places for talks. Karjalainen replied Finland hopes for successful SALT talks and would be pleased if Helsinki is site, provided US and USSR want this. In response question, Karjalainen said Soviets "probably" really desire arms limitations, partly for economic reasons.

(b) Sino-Soviet Split: In response question, Karjalainen said Finland had good contacts with both parties. He said China does not seem to expect war and situation is not bothering USSR leaders much either. The latter think China will be an "actual" problem in 10 or 20 years.

(c) European Security Conference: Karjalainen reported that USSR leaders sincerely want an ESC. Finland's May suggestion of bilateral discussions leading to preliminary conference and ESC in Helsinki was entirely its own initiative in attempt get some movement, according to Karjalainen. The Secretary said US interested in any kind of discussion with USSR, especially about Europe. While US favors ESC, in principle, we have reservations about intentions of USSR in conference. A conference, with many people dealing with complex problems, could exacerbate East-West relations. We want to find out what the USSR has in mind. We think USSR may want mainly to distract world attention from its actions in Czechoslovakia. When US knows what Soviets have in mind, and after NATO and bilateral discussions, we will consider participation in ESC. If conference agreed on, Helsinki would be acceptable to us as site.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FIN-US. Confidential; Noform; Limdis. Drafted by Paul Hughes (EUR/SCAN) on September 16; cleared by Ingram (EUR/SCAN), McGuire (EUR/RPM), Okun (S), Harbin (EA/VN), and Gleysteen (S/S); and approved by Hillenbrand.

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 16, 1969. Ibid.

(d) Viet-Nam: Secretary emphasized that US position is reasonable; American people support Nixon administration 2 to 1 on conduct of war; US is open to any proposal which will allow South Viet-Nam choose own future except proposal that US unilaterally withdraw. If North Viet-Nam continues to refuse to negotiate seriously in Paris, we will gradually withdraw and turn over responsibility for defense to South Viet-Nam as soon as they are ready with trained manpower and equipment and weapons provided by US to assume self-defense burden. We hope that perhaps USSR will decide it is to its advantage to pressure NVN to negotiate, particularly in view of USSR difficulties with China. The US has no interest in invading NVN but will not leave SVN until the South can determine its own future. In response to question, the Secretary said that in short range Ho Chi Minh's death<sup>3</sup> would probably not change situation, but in longer run it would have effect. For one thing, there is no other NVN leader who has Ho's charismatic appeal in South.

(e) Middle East: Secretary said we neither pro-Israel nor anti-Arab; present situation is discouraging because neither side interested in settlement now; US is still ready to talk to anyone about ME. UN discussion sometimes is useful as damper on activity in ME. The US willing to go on talking with USSR, UK and France but not optimistic of results at present. Foreign Minister said Finland considers ME problem serious one, especially as people of area are so demonstrative that there is danger of escalation of conflict.

3. Karjalainen thanked Secretary for opportunity, already almost a tradition, to discuss informally matters of mutual interest just prior to UNGA session. He expressed hope that contact between himself and Secretary might be maintained and expressed Finland's willingness to be helpful in any way it can. The Secretary expressed pleasure at meeting with Foreign Minister and remarked that we consider Finland a neutral in the best sense. There are neutrals and neutrals. The US understands Finland's position and approves of it. It is harder to understand Swedish sort of neutrality.

4. Cleared Memorandum will be air-pouched.<sup>4</sup>

**Rogers**

---

<sup>3</sup> The North Vietnamese President died on September 3.

<sup>4</sup> Memoranda of this conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL FIN–US.

97. **Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

Helsinki, April 9, 1970, 1500Z.

360. Subject: Conversation With Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen.

1. During course of two and one-half hour sauna with FonMin Ahti Karjalainen, we discussed numerous topics of mutual interest. Only other persons present at sauna were Director FonMin Political Office Hyvarinen and Chief Embassy PolSec Owens. Among topics covered were following:

(a) Soviet Leadership—FonMin said that he had met repeatedly with top Soviet leaders and felt he knew them reasonably well. He considered Kosygin to be relatively reasonable person, but said Brezhnev impressed him as rather inflexible and that there was something “dark” in his nature. He pointed out that as far as he knew, Brezhnev had never visited West, which perhaps accounted to some degree for his rigidity and narrow outlook. Podgorny, he commented, seemed to carry very little weight in Soviet hierarchy. On other hand, he viewed M. Suslov as “extremely important” figure.

(b) Soviet-Finnish relations—When I pointed out view often expressed both in Finland and abroad that Finnish foreign policy dominated by Moscow, Karjalainen emphatically denied this was case. (His denial impressed me as rather forced.) He acknowledged that Finns often “consulted” with Soviets re planned course of action but never asked for approval either before or after taking specific actions. He likened this consultation to what he assumed small neighbor of any super power would probably follow, and (after some groping for analogy) cited Mexico-US relations as parallel case. He asserted Finns often turned Moscow down flatly on specific requests, and listed as example of this Finnish rejection Soviet pressure for recognition of East German regime. He added that GOF had learned that best way to do business with Moscow was to refuse clearly Soviet requests rather than to equivocate and create misleading impression that request might be acceded to later when there was no intention of doing so.

(c) Conference on European Security—I reiterated our position on CES (i.e., need for Soviets to demonstrate constructive approach on specific issues before consideration could be given to holding conference, etc.). FonMin said he understood US position but hoped Amb

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL FIN-US. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, Moscow, Paris, USNATO, Copenhagen, Oslo, and Stockholm.

Enckell<sup>2</sup> would be received in Washington to discuss conference. I replied it my understanding that this would be done, but pointed out dangers if Enckell moved from capital to capital disclosing views of one European state to another. Karjalainen assured me this would not be case, and that Enckell would not divulge positions of various European countries to other states. After Enckell had visited number of countries he would probably issue report on progress to date. He said British seemed to be most negative of major NATO nations towards CES. FonMin acknowledged that there seemed to be one insurmountable obstacle to success of CES, and that is Soviet insistence that conference recognize status quo in Europe and Western refusal to do so. I concurred that NATO nations would certainly not agree to ratify present division of Europe and added that Brezhnev Doctrine specifically was unacceptable to US.

(d) US-Finnish Relations—FonMin said he considered bilateral US-Finnish relations excellent, to which I fully agreed. I pointed out that there had been some minor irritations in past, which, however, had been largely cleared up. I mentioned specifically speech by Communist member of Cabinet attacking US Vietnam policy in rally last August. I reiterated statement I had made then, that while members of sovereign govt could criticize whomever they wished, by attacking one side in conflict they throw into question their neutral status. I also rejected contention that Cabinet member could speak as private citizen at public rally. FonMin said he agreed, and implied he considered speech unfortunate. However, he made point, which I accepted as valid, that there has been extremely little criticism of US Vietnam policy in Finland; Hyvarinen added that at meetings of Nordic nations, Finland was generally country least critical of US Vietnam policy. I also mentioned FonMin's speech in UNGA in 1968<sup>3</sup> calling for cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam as example of coming down on one side of dispute between two parties.

(e) Contract for Construction Atomic Power Plant—I cited awarding of contract to Soviet Union to build atomic power plant despite lower Western bids as kind of action which discredits Finnish assertions of neutrality. Somewhat to my surprise, Karjalainen agreed wholeheartedly, and said that key factor in contract award was that there were so many parties in govt and that so many different individuals in govt got into act on this question that it became hopelessly confused.

---

<sup>2</sup> Ralph Enckell, Finnish permanent representative to the United Nations, 1959–1965; ambassador at large.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the October 7, 1968, speech, see UN doc. A/PV.1684.

2. *Comment:* I think our exchange of views, which was unusually friendly and frank for generally reserved FonMin, was valuable. Although Karjalainen may not be FonMin in next govt,<sup>4</sup> he is considered good possibility for Prime Ministership position. I think result of our conversation was to clarify views of both govts and particularly to emphasize to Finns our close interest in actions and statements which affect US interests. One indication of this was initiative by Karjalainen directing Hyvarinen to seek closer consultation with US in future on matters of mutual interest.

Peterson

---

<sup>4</sup> In the March 15–16 elections, the ruling coalition lost a total of 29 seats but was able to form a new coalition government.

---

## 98. Intelligence Information Cable<sup>1</sup>

TDCS DB 315/03743–70

Washington, July 21, 1970.

COUNTRY

Finland/USSR

DOI

17–20 July 1970

SUBJECT

Concession by Soviet Union to Finnish Demands in Exchange for Extension of Fenno-Soviet Friendship Pact During Kekkonen Official Visit to Moscow.

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[5½ lines not declassified]

1. In return for agreement to extend the 1948 Fenno-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for another twenty years beyond its scheduled expiration date of 1975, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen extracted two important concessions from the Soviet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 673, Country Files—Europe, Finland, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the CIA and sent to agencies in the Intelligence Community.

Union during his official visit to the USSR from 17–20 July 1970: (1) Acceptance of Finnish emphasis on the word “neutrality” to describe Finnish foreign policy and its obligations under the pact, and (2) Acceptance of Finland’s desire to seek its own best avenues for foreign trade. For its own part, Finland indicated its willingness to purchase natural gas and a second atomic power plant from the Soviet Union.

2. The unwritten agreement on Finnish foreign trade, which is interpreted by Kekkonen and other Finnish officials as tacit Soviet consent to Finland’s intention to make its own arrangements with the European Economic Community (EEC), was the subject of prolonged and difficulty negotiations. When Kekkonen left Moscow for a side trip to Kiev on 18 July, he gave Finnish Foreign Office Political Department Chief Dr. Risto Hyvarinen strict orders forbidding him from backing down on this point. As of 1220 hours on 20 July, it actually appeared that the Finns might not sign the joint communiqué because the Soviets had not yet acceded to the Finnish demand. However, they ultimately did so. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment:* It is apparent that Hyvarinen, rather than Foreign Minister Vaino Leskinen, was the key Finnish negotiator on the foreign trade question.) During his speech at a luncheon at the Finnish Embassy on 20 July, Kekkonen announced that Finland would seek its own arrangements for foreign trade. Present on this occasion among others were Premier Aleksey Kosygin, President Nikolay Podgorny, Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay Patolichev, Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, and Politburo members Kirill Mazurov, Aleksandr Shelepin, Petr Shelest, and Arvid Pelshe.

3. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment:* By way of background to the Finnish position during this visit, Finnish officials decided in February 1970, when Soviet Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev first raised with Kekkonen the question of extending the Fenno-Soviet Pact, that the Soviets were extraordinarily anxious to renew the Pact, apparently because of the USSR’s pending negotiations with West Germany in August 1970. Remembering Finnish President Paasikivi’s diplomatic success in 1955 when renewal of the Pact led to Soviet return of the Porkkala Naval Base, leading Finnish economic specialists advised Kekkonen that he should try to exploit the apparent Soviet concern by extracting as many concessions as possible from the Soviets in return for Finnish agreement to extend the Pact beyond 1975. Freedom of maneuver to negotiate with EEC was deemed to be the most important goal, along with the neutrality question. While the timing is not entirely clear, Finnish negotiations with EEC would probably begin only when the British negotiations have been completed. Six months to one year would be an educated guess.)

4. Kekkonen stated privately that he considers this trip his greatest victory in the entire history of his dealings with the Soviets.

5. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*)



**99. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Finnish President Kekkonen

You are scheduled to hold one session with President Kekkonen at 11:00 a.m. Thursday, July 23, for approximately one hour following the official arrival ceremony. You will also be with him at your black tie dinner that evening.

Points for your arrival statement and dinner toast will be sent to you separately.

*Background and Setting*

This will be your first meeting with President Kekkonen, and his second official visit to the US since becoming President in 1956.<sup>2</sup> Only three days separate his arrival in Washington and the conclusion of his state visit to the USSR.

Kekkonen's visit reflects his desire to establish with you a personal relationship not unlike the one he has with the leaders of the Soviet Union (although he has seen and will continue to see them much more often). The Finns will also wish to use this visit to demonstrate that Finnish neutrality is accepted by the US, that its delicate situation is understood, and that Finland may have powerful friends of choice as well as of necessity.

A 788 mile border separates 4.7 million Finns from 239 million Russians; during the course of their history, the Finns have been defeated in 42 wars with Russia, though not without displaying enormous courage in the process, as in 1939–40. These facts have a tremendous impact on virtually every facet of Finnish domestic and foreign relations. However, they in no way diminish and indeed enhance the genuine and particularly warm feeling the Finns have for the US and Americans. This sense of affinity may be largely a product of family and cultural connections, but it must also reflect the Finns' awareness that the strength and vigor of the US are ultimately vital to Finland's

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 915, VIP Visits, Finland, Pres of Finland, July 1970. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it on July 24.

<sup>2</sup> Kekkonen visited the United States in October 1961; see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 189.

survival as long as there is no real *détente* in Europe and Soviet Russia does not change its character.

In foreign relations, Finland is committed to a special brand of neutrality, codified in the 1948 Peace Treaty with the USSR—which was just formally renewed and extended for 20 years at the conclusion of Kekkonen's visit on July 20. By the Treaty, Finland is to "remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers."<sup>3</sup> The Finns interpret this to include political as well as military conflicts. As a result, the Finns have not become emotional partisans as have the "neutral" Swedes, and have developed a general policy of non-recognition where states are divided such as Germany, Korea and Vietnam.

Clever as the Finns have been in developing and maintaining their neutrality, there is no doubt that their freedom of movement is tightly circumscribed. They know that to preserve Finnish independence, the Soviets must feel assured that Finnish actions will never constitute a threat to Soviet security. Keeping the Soviets convinced is an unending task for the Finns. There is a relatively large Communist Party in Finland,<sup>4</sup> and the Soviets are prone to rather heavy-handed interference in Finnish domestic affairs.

One recent example of this type of Soviet impact relates to the abortive NORDEC arrangement. Lengthy negotiations had been held among Finland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden for the creation of a Nordic economic union, and a draft treaty was even approved by foreign ministers. One month later, in April, Kekkonen announced that Finland was rejecting the proposed treaty since it would have undermined the preservation of Finnish neutrality. Soviet displeasure caused Kekkonen to scuttle the NORDEC project.<sup>5</sup>

The domestic political scene offers a second example of Soviet pressure on the Finns. In the mid-March parliamentary elections the conservative parties won dramatically and the local Communist-front party declined. This caused a political crisis, as efforts persisted to restore the former center-left coalition. The Soviets made it quite plain to Kekkonen that they wanted to see the formation of a coalition (like the pre-election one) before Kekkonen came to Moscow. Largely as a result of this pressure, a new Finnish Government—a center-left coalition—was installed on July 15, just two days before Kekkonen's departure for his visit to the USSR.

To balance this pressure from the East, the Finns have associated themselves as much as possible with other Scandinavian countries, and

---

<sup>3</sup> The President underlined most of this sentence.

<sup>4</sup> The President underlined: "relatively large Communist Party in Finland."

<sup>5</sup> In this paragraph the President underlined: "Nordic economic union" and "rejecting the proposed treaty."

with Western and world organizations. For years, Finland has provided troops for UN peacekeeping missions, notably in Cyprus and along the Suez. The Finns believe that by such efforts on the world stage, the world will find it has a stake in Finland's independence.<sup>6</sup>

President Kekkonen, for more than 15 years, has dominated Finnish domestic politics and foreign relations. He sees himself as the only Finn who possesses the necessary rapport with Soviet leaders to maintain their confidence. He has kept pace with all the twists and turns of Kremlin politics; he was a frequent companion of Khrushchev, and has maintained good relations with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny. With his basic motive of preserving Finnish neutrality and independence, Kekkonen has visited the USSR no less than 16 times since he became President in 1956.<sup>7</sup>

*Your Objectives*<sup>8</sup>

In your discussions with Kekkonen, your goals will be to

—assure him that we accept and value Finnish neutrality, that we understand their need for friendly relations with the Soviets, and that we would be concerned only if Finland's independence, neutrality and free institutions were endangered;

—allow him time and a feeling of confidence to talk about the USSR, and particularly his assessment of the Soviet leaders, their problems and motives;

—cultivate and establish a personal rapport with Kekkonen, and impress on him your seriousness in pursuing all serious efforts to achieve peace and stability.

(To the Soviets you want to demonstrate that you do *not* regard Finland as exclusively in their sphere.)

*Particular Points to Emphasize*

1. *The Soviet Union.*<sup>9</sup> Particularly in the light of Kekkonen's visit to the USSR, it will be useful to seek his assessment of Soviet developments

---

<sup>6</sup> In this paragraph the President underlined: "associated" and "as much as possible with other Scandinavian countries" and "UN peacekeeping missions, notably Cyprus and along Suez."

<sup>7</sup> In this paragraph the President underlined "was a frequent companion of Khrushchev" and "Kekkonen has visited the USSR no less than 16 times since he became President in 1956."

<sup>8</sup> In the objectives the President underlined "we accept and value Finnish neutrality," "understand their need for friendly relations with the Soviets," "confidence to talk about the USSR, and particularly his assessment," and "rapport with Kekkonen."

<sup>9</sup> In particular points to emphasize, Soviet Union, the President underlined: "assessment of Soviet developments," "state of Soviet society and leadership," and "Soviets have not adequately reciprocated our efforts to bridge the conflicts that hobble our bilateral relations."

and to take this opportunity to explain your views of US-Soviet relations in relation to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

*You may wish to*

- seek his assessment of the state of Soviet society and leadership, ask about postponement of the 24th CPSU Congress, and inquire whether he anticipates any changes in the near future (he may have some astute observations on Soviet leadership personalities);

- stress that the Soviets have not adequately reciprocated our efforts to bridge the conflicts that hobble our bilateral relations, except perhaps for the SALT talks;

- explain the considerable US restraint in the Middle East, as contrasted with the growing Soviet military involvement there which contains the seeds of grave and broad confrontation;

- refer to the lack of Soviet willingness to take effective steps to encourage its clients to make progress in the Paris peace talks; stress your desire for a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia and your hope that Ambassador Bruce's mission will be successful; ask about the role of China.

2. *SALT*. The Finns were extremely pleased that the first session of the SALT talks was held in Helsinki for it dramatically underscored Finnish neutrality and assisted its independence. Kekkonen will be interested in your evaluation of these talks.

*You may wish to*

- stress your appreciation for the Finnish reception at the Helsinki phase, where you consider a good foundation was laid for the talks in Vienna;

- indicate the general trend in the talks, and point out that you hope there will be some definite and clear understanding reached before the conclusion of the Vienna phase, so that, as agreed, the talks can again return to Helsinki.

3. *European Security Conference*.<sup>10</sup> In May 1969 the Finns proposed a Conference on European Security, and offered Helsinki as the site—when conditions are propitious. Several months ago, the Finns appointed one of their senior diplomats, Ralph Enckell, as a Roving Ambassador to solicit views of interested governments. Their approach on the Conference is generally similar to ours; indeed, it is closer than the position of some of our NATO allies.

*You may wish to*

- express your appreciation for Finnish efforts, and for the soundings made by Ambassador Enckell;

---

<sup>10</sup> In particular points to emphasize, European Security Conference, the President underlined: "express your appreciation for Finnish efforts," "only if," and "it would achieve positive results."

—stress your view that a Conference could be useful only if there were reasonable assurances it would achieve positive results, and if there had been some success in current negotiations, particularly the Four Power talks in Berlin, and the series of German negotiations with the East;

—explain that nevertheless we shall continue to pursue bilateral contacts in an effort to clarify the recent statements from the Warsaw Pact, especially on the issue of mutual and balanced force reductions.

4. *Trade and European Communities.* A principal concern of Finland is that its economy not be undermined by a European economic integration in which it has no part. Though Finland is an associate member of the European Free Trade Area, it recognizes the trade implications of the European Communities—60% of its total trade is with the Community and the four candidates for admission (plus Sweden). The Finns have asked for a trade agreement with the Community. *If President Kekkonen raises this matter, you may wish to*

—explain that we have no objection to arrangements between the neutral states and the European Community, though we would not wish to see any development which forecloses the further political development of the Community;

—while these issues have yet to emerge, you doubt whether any arrangement the Finns work out with the European Community could affect US support for those institutions;

—though the issue is one for the Europeans to decide among themselves, the US will review any Finnish arrangement in the light of its impact on our trade and compatibility with GATT, and with due respect for Finland's special neutrality.

If time permits, you may wish to express confidence in Ambassador Peterson, our envoy in Helsinki; and appreciation for the efforts of the Finnish Ambassador in Washington, Ambassador Munkki.<sup>11</sup>

Secretary Rogers will be meeting concurrently in the Cabinet Room with Foreign Minister Leskinen and other members of Kekkonen's party.<sup>12</sup> Kekkonen will have his own interpreter; Navy Captain Minkkinen will serve as your interpreter.

More detailed talking points, a memorandum from Secretary Rogers and biographic information are included in a separate book if you wish to review them. Your schedule for the visit is at Tab A, and a biographic sketch of President Kekkonen is at Tab B.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> In this paragraph the President underlined: "express confidence in Ambassador Peterson, our envoy in Helsinki."

<sup>12</sup> Parts 1, 3, and 4 of the memorandum of conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 FIN. Part 2 is Document 101.

<sup>13</sup> Attached but not printed.

**100. Record of Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 23, 1970, 10:45 a.m.

DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND  
PRESIDENT KEKKONEN AT THE WHITE HOUSE  
AT 10:45 A.M. JULY 23, 1970

The President, Mr. Kissinger, and Captain Erkki Minkinen, USN, DOD, Interpreter; President Kekkonen and Ambassador Max Jakobson, Finnish Permanent Representative to the UN, who served as interpreter, were present.

*Conference on European Security*

President Kekkonen said the Soviets are pushing a conference on European security because they want their western front to be secure in the face of Chinese pressures. However, they also are influenced by the economic situation within the Soviet Union. There has been much pressure recently to raise the Soviet standard of living. The stationing of troops indefinitely within the East Bloc is a severe drain on the Soviet economy. A third reason is pressure from the East Bloc satellites. The satellites strongly desire such a conference. History has shown that armed rebellion does not work, as evidenced in Hungary. It has also shown that quick economic change does not work, as evidenced in Czechoslovakia. The last resort for the East Bloc satellites is to get more individual freedom through the conference table.

President Kekkonen said that security talks should be held in Finland because Finland has representation (albeit non-diplomatic) from both Germanys. Furthermore, Finland is neutral. When questioned by President Nixon as to the Soviet approach to holding a security conference, President Kekkonen replied that, for the first time in all of his trips to Moscow, the Soviets had used the word “flexible” in explaining their desire to reach agreement through East-West talks.

President Kekkonen suggested that exploratory talks be held in Helsinki at the Ambassadorial level. President Nixon remarked that he has much faith in the United States Ambassador to Helsinki because Ambassador Peterson is a close personal friend and he had nominated him to that post. He requested President Kekkonen’s evaluation of the competence of other Ambassadors in Helsinki. President Kekkonen jokingly replied that an assessment such as this would be very difficult.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 915, VIP Visits, Finland, Pres of Finland, July 1970. Secret; Nodis.

Some of the Ambassadors are good, some are bad, and he doubted that any of them would be the type of person normally sent by their governments to negotiate international treaties. However, this would be a good place to start. Even the SALT talks perhaps started in the same fashion. President Nixon asked Mr. Kissinger whether such a suggestion had been made before. Mr. Kissinger said he was not familiar with the suggestion. President Kekkonen observed that this was only an extension of an earlier Belgian recommendation.

President Nixon said he did not believe we should enter a security conference unless there is reason to believe it would not be used for propaganda purposes, and that some agreement could be reached. He explained that the Glassboro talks<sup>2</sup> are an example of what he does not want. During these talks the whole world was lifted to the point of believing that such talks could end the Cold War, but nothing came of them. For this reason he would like to look further into President Kekkonen's suggestion. President Nixon reiterated that it would remain a requirement that some substantive solution would result from such talks before we entered into them.

### *SALT*

President Nixon described the status of the SALT talks. He explained that the SALT talks will result in an agreement on two or three points. This is a good start. The talks would continue in Helsinki and perhaps the announcement of an agreement would be made there.

### *Soviet Leadership*

President Nixon asked President Kekkonen for his assessment of the current leadership in the Soviet Union. Kekkonen replied that he believed the collective leadership is currently stable. Kosygin is strong. This is a change from last February when Kosygin had confided to Kekkonen that he had asked to be relieved of his duties for reasons of health. The collective leadership had denied his request. During his last week's visit in the Soviet Union, Kosygin appeared to be his same old self. Each of the Soviet leaders has his own strong professionalism which is not challenged by the others.

Kosygin had told Kekkonen that he knows that the West always asks about the aging Russian generals. Kosygin advised Kekkonen to tell the West that behind each general is a younger man. President Nixon commented: "With a knife?"

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference to the June 23 and 25 meetings of President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey. Documentation is in *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 228-229, 231-232, and 234-235.

*The Middle East*

President Nixon asked President Kekkonen about Nasser's visit to the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> Kekkonen replied that, although the climate did not appear disturbed and everybody said that Nasser's visit was completely successful, he felt that the long communiqué<sup>4</sup> resulting from the meeting indicated there were problems.

President Nixon explained the United States position on the Middle East. The entire population of the United States is agreed on our Middle East position. The Middle East is many times more dangerous than Viet-Nam has ever been. Any increase in aid to Egypt, particularly Soviet personnel, will increase this hazard. The first Soviet encounter with Israel will be extremely dangerous. Any increase in the size of the Soviet fleet will be considered as an escalation of the war.

President Kekkonen said that Nasser's decision to come to the conference table resulted, without a doubt, from Soviet pressure, but he stressed that he had no message for President Nixon on the Middle East situation. Earlier Kosygin had given Kekkonen a message but withdrew it by saying that he, Kosygin, can communicate with Nixon directly.

*Viet-Nam*

President Nixon gave President Kekkonen a status report on Viet-Nam. He said he understands well that neither the Soviet Union nor China can reduce tensions in this area because it is the policy of each to export revolution. As such, neither could press to end the war. The Cambodian affair<sup>5</sup> was significantly and strategically important to the war in Viet-Nam. Over a year's supply of weapons and food were captured and destroyed.

President Nixon explained that the United States will pull out of Viet-Nam on schedule, and he suggested that it would be wise for North Viet-Nam to come to the conference table now, because after withdrawal negotiating with South Viet-Nam may not be as attractive as would be negotiations with the United States. Vietnamization is going well. These things sometimes change. However, even if Vietnamization does not go as well in the future, the United States can still withdraw its troops on schedule.

---

<sup>3</sup> June 29–July 17.

<sup>4</sup> Extracts of the statement are printed in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1969–1970, pp. 24117–24118.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the April 29 invasion of Cambodia by U.S. forces in an effort to cut off supply lines for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in South Vietnam.



*China*

President Kekkonen said that he had no direct knowledge about the situation in China. Moscow is not as concerned about China as it was in February. However, the China question would continue to linger on and be a basic consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions for the foreseeable future. The China question would remain for some two to three years even after the death of Mao.

*Economic Questions*

President Kekkonen said he had two or three very important economic questions to raise with President Nixon which might not be important to a country like the United States but are vital to Finland. President Nixon suggested that these could be discussed later, but in any event President Kekkonen should discuss them with Secretary Rogers and Secretary Stans.

---

**101. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 23, 1970, 3:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Finnish-Soviet Trade

**PARTICIPANTS***Finland*

President Urho Kekkonen

Foreign Minister Vaino Leskinen

Olavi Munkki, Ambassador to the United States

Ambassador Max Jakobson, Permanent Representative to the UN

Major General Levo, Aide de Camp to President Kekkonen

Dr. Risto Hyvarinen, Director of Political Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Aarno Karhilo, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Paavo Laitinen, Chief of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Pauli Opas, First Secretary, Finnish Embassy

*United States*

The Secretary

Val Peterson, U.S. Ambassador to Finland

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 FIN. Secret. Drafted by Sampas and approved in S on August 6. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part 2 of 4. The other parts are *ibid*.

Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
Margaret J. Tibbetts, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR  
James G. Sampas, EUR/SCAN  
Captain Erkki Minkkinen, USN, DOD, Interpreter

President Kekkonen reported that, during his July 17–20 visit to Moscow, there had been a lengthy discussion of bilateral economic matters. The Soviet Union had earlier agreed to provide Finland with its first atomic reactor on favorable credit terms. The site of the first reactor is such as to make it desirable to construct the second atomic reactor next to it for reasons of economy. Agreement has now been reached on the purchase of a second Soviet reactor with repayment terms of 20 years at 2½ percent.

The Secretary asked whether commercial or other reasons motivated the Soviets. President Kekkonen replied that the Finns took the initiative. They did not know whether the Soviets were willing to sell a second reactor on the same terms as the first. An important consideration was the question of fuel.

Another subject discussed in Moscow, President Kekkonen said, was natural gas. Finland has the problem of rapidly increasing fuel consumption. Within the next few years, Finland will require the equivalent of an additional one to four million tons of oil. Finland's balance of payments position would be severely affected if oil had to be purchased. The Soviets have agreed to bring a natural gas pipeline to the border. This will fulfill Finland's energy needs.

One project discussed in Moscow, but not publicly mentioned, President Kekkonen said, was the construction in the Soviet Union by Finland of a large scale pulp and paper plant. If the project goes through, several thousand Finnish workers will be involved. He had discussed the plant with Kosygin earlier and it had been thought the plant would be in Siberia. Its construction near Archangel is now planned.

President Kekkonen explained that Finnish-Soviet trade is on a bilateral basis. Now that Finland is able to buy, the Soviets are unable to deliver. For several years, the Soviets have complained that Finland treats the USSR like an underdeveloped country in that Finland buys raw materials from it and sells it processed goods.

The Secretary asked whether renewal of the 1948 friendship treaty and trade matters were part of a package deal. President Kekkonen responded that the treaty and trade matters were handled at separate levels.

**102. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Helsinki, March 10, 1971, 1604Z.

247. Subj: Discussion With President Kekkonen. Policy.

1. I called on Finnish President Urho Kekkonen this afternoon to discuss his recent two-day trip to the Soviet Union, where he had spent two full days hunting with Podgorny, Brezhnev, and Kosygin. I found the President relaxed, and the discussion, which lasted 45 minutes was conducted in a frank and amicable manner. The only other person present was a Finnish interpreter.

2. I told the President that I was calling on him to discuss in a general way his recent visit to Moscow. I said I did not intend to question him on specific issues, but rather wished to know his general impression of current Soviet thinking on major East-West issues. I pointed out that he had had a unique opportunity to gauge the attitude of the top leadership, having been in close contact for two days with the Soviet "troika."

3. Observing that the most important questions in the world today hinge on US-Soviet relations, I asked the President, in view of his 15 years as Chief of State and his intimate association during these years with the Soviet leaders, whether he might have any suggestions for easing tensions between the two powers. I said I recognized that he would not presume to give unsolicited advice to the leaders of either super power, but in view of the tremendous importance of this question to all nations in the world, including the neutrals, his thoughts would be helpful. I concluded with the specific question: "What would you do if you were in President Nixon's position today, faced with the great burden of seeking peace?"

4. Kekkonen replied that his advice would be for President Nixon to send a message to President Podgorny offering to visit the Soviet Union to meet with him and the other Soviet leaders to discuss problems of mutual interest. Such a proposed meeting, he added, should take place after the forthcoming Soviet Party Congress. Continuing, the President said that the Soviet leaders seem to "lack trust" in President Nixon; when I asked him why, he said he did not know. However, he said in his view, trust is something that could be built. Kekkonen said that from his association with them, he had found the Soviet leaders

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL FIN-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and USNATO.

to be “reasonable men” and a “summit meeting” would certainly not worsen the situation and might very well improve it. The Soviet leaders, he added, know the necessity for some kind of accommodation with the US and seem fully aware of the consequences if there is not.

5. Kosygin and Brezhnev. I asked the President his evaluation of the current Soviet leaders. He replied that he found Kosygin in a much better “physical condition and mental outlook” than on his last visit to the USSR (July 1970). Kosygin seemed much more vivacious than on the previous occasion. Kekkonen said he personally believes that Kosygin has a much better comprehension of world problems than the other Soviet leaders. On the other hand, he admitted that Brezhnev clearly seems to be the dominant figure among the Soviet leaders. He said it “is difficult to say why,” but he has some characteristics that differentiate him from the other two men. Perhaps, the President suggested, his strength is due to his secure party base. Kekkonen did not discuss Podgorny.

6. Vietnam. What, I asked, are the problems most preoccupying the Soviet leaders with regard to the West? The President replied that the two chief concerns are Vietnam and the Mid-East. On Vietnam, the Soviets charged that President Nixon had “expanded” the war in Indochina by the entrance into Laos;<sup>2</sup> I challenged this, noting that the North Vietnamese had years ago “expanded” the war to Laos.

7. The Mid-East. Concerning the Mid-East, Kekkonen said the Soviets believed that the US and USSR have a mutual interest in seeing that problem settled peacefully. He said the Soviets expressed concern lest some “hothead” Egyptian army officers get out of Sadat’s control and ignite a conflict in the area.

8. Soviet Jews. The President said the Soviet leaders showed considerable sensitivity over the criticism directed at them for Soviet handling of Jews in the USSR. He said they went to considerable lengths to explain that there no “pogroms” against Jews in the USSR, and seemed quite upset at agitation in the US against their handling of the Jews.

9. Expansionism. I pointed out that one of our concerns was the growing Soviet expansionism throughout the world, as reflected by moving of the Soviet fleet into every major sea. Kekkonen laughed at this comment, and said that he had once discussed this question with General DeGaulle, when the latter was still President. DeGaulle, he continued, had observed that he was not worried by Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean; “great powers,” DeGaulle commented, “by

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to U.S. support for the incursion of South Vietnamese forces into Laos.

their nature must make their presence felt everywhere." Kekkonen added that while the Soviets had become more expansionist in recent years, the US too had demonstrated "expansionist" tendencies in the past.

10. SALT and CES. Regarding SALT, the President did not enlarge on his public comments that the Soviets are somewhat optimistic about a successful outcome of the talks. Concerning CES, I complimented him on the low-key, cautious approach recently assumed by the GOF on this question, and he observed that there was only limited discussion of this question in Moscow.

11. Finnish-Soviet Trade. The President said that there was a long discussion of Finnish-Soviet trade in Moscow, but the basic problem, Kekkonen observed, is the limited number of items the Finns can find to buy from the USSR. This problem, he added, has been facing the GOF for some 20 years, and will probably be around long after he (Kekkonen) leaves office. The President added that there were no major bilateral problems that had to be discussed during his visit.

12. Berlin. Although the President did not refer to the German question, he said the Soviets did mention Berlin, noting that they had made a proposal to the Western powers on Berlin but had not yet received a response.

13. *Comment:* Inasmuch as Kekkonen is probably on closer terms with the top Soviet leadership than any other non-Communist leader, his comments are worthy of careful study. He is a shrewd judge of character, and probably knows the Soviet leaders as well as any outsider can. Particularly interesting is his suggestion that President Nixon visit the Soviet Union; it obviously reflects the President's personal belief in "summit" diplomacy as a way of dealing with Soviet leaders.

**Peterson**

**103. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 7, 1971, 0143Z.

Secto 74/3233. Bonn for Embassy and Under Secretary's Party. Memorandum of Conversation: FM Leskinen (Finland). Part II of V: European Security; October 5, 1971; 12:15 PM, 35A Waldorf.

1. Participants: Finland—FM Leskinen, Ambassador Jakobson, Ambassador Munkki, Finnish Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Hyvarinen, Foreign Minister; US—The Secretary, Mr. De Palma, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Waring (reporting officer).

2. *Summary*: At Leskinen's request, the Secretary reviewed our position on the relationship between the Berlin Agreement<sup>2</sup> and a CES. He also reviewed our thinking on a CES and MBFR, noting that the Soviets did not seem to have a clear picture of what they wanted. He also stated that we shied away from multilateral preparatory talks. Regarding the Finnish proposal to have a Finnish representative have bilateral talks separately with interested parties in Helsinki the Secretary said it was too early to pass judgment and moreover that NATO consultations were required. Leskinen noted that he had settled with Scheel the problem of recognition consultations with the two German states.

3. Congratulating the Secretary on the talk which he had delivered to the UNGA,<sup>3</sup> "which was excellent in all respects and had even found a good reaction on the part of the Soviets," Leskinen asked if he could have Mr. Rogers' views on such matters as Berlin and a security conference. The Secretary replied that both we and the Soviets believe that the Berlin Agreement will be completed. He noted that our relations with the Soviet Union had made progress. There existed of course differences, but there were much less polemic in exchanges. As for a CES, nothing much could take place until the 4-Power Agreement on Berlin was implemented. He anticipated that this would be around the first of the year. Preparatory talks should be on a bilateral basis, the Secretary thought. We shy away from multilateral preparatory talks, as these have the tendency to take on a form of their own. However, we are not adamant in this respect. The Secretary added that we did not know exactly how the Soviets related MBFR with CES. Would be

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL FIN–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Helsinki and USNATO, and priority to Bonn. Rogers was in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Berlin Agreement, signed September 3, 1971, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1135–1143.

<sup>3</sup> October 4; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1971, pp. 437–444.

difficult without MBFR. Perhaps both could take place simultaneously, but in different forums. We had an open mind on the matter.

4. Leskinen asked the Secretary's views about so-called multilateral-bilateral talks after the Berlin Agreement is implemented. He had in mind a Finnish official talking individually to the parties concerned. The Secretary replied that it was too early to pass judgment on such a procedure. In any event NATO consultations were required. Reverting to CES-MBFR, the Secretary observed that while neutral countries could and should be present at a CES, he did not see their place in a MBFR, as the Soviets seemed to wish. He asked Leskinen if Finland were interested in reducing its armed forces, and Leskinen observed that Finland just did not have enough to be interested in such a matter.

5. Leskinen then mentioned his conversation with FRG FonMin Scheel, noting that he had cleared up the difficulties with Scheel regarding eventual recognition of both German states. (Scheel had informed the Secretary about the same matter on October 1.) The Secretary remarked that he thought that this was a good idea.

**Rogers**

---

#### **104. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Helsinki, March 22, 1972, 1405Z.

431. Department Pass White House. Subject: Talk with President Kekkonen. Policy.

1. *Summary.* President Kekkonen told me during a private talk that Soviet leadership seemed sincere in its relief that US and USSR could reach accord on problems of mutual interest. Kekkonen also impressed by President Nixon's imagination and courage in undertaking visits to Peking and Moscow.<sup>2</sup> Kekkonen noted that there is an outstanding invitation to President Nixon to visit Finland and that Mrs. Nixon would be welcome alone if President were unable to come. *End summary.*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL FIN-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> President Nixon visited China February 17-28 and the Soviet Union May 22-30.

2. On March 21 I made a call on Finnish President Urho Kekkonen. Our discussion, which lasted close to an hour, touched on a variety of subjects but, as could be expected, dwelt primarily on East-West and Sino-Soviet-US relations. Kekkonen was friendly, outgoing and affable and seemed to be frank in conversation.

3. I was principally interested in obtaining President Kekkonen's assessment of the attitudes of the Soviet leadership on major world matters. Kekkonen is probably the Western head of state with the most frequent and intimate contacts with the Soviet leadership, having made 18 visits to the USSR since taking office in 1956 and having received Soviet leaders in Finland on a number of occasions. Most recently (February 26 and 27) he spent two days hunting with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny at Zavidovo, some 70 miles outside of Moscow, with only his military aides and an interpreter accompanying him.

4. US-Soviet relations. Kekkonen said it was his clear impression after his visit with the Soviet triumvirate that the Soviet leaders, regardless of such differences as may exist between the US and the USSR, sincerely believe that they and we share a real common interest in negotiating a solution of problems of mutual concern to the benefit of both and to the world. Kekkonen added that he shares this view.

5. US-Chinese relations. Kekkonen said that the Soviet leaders were closely following the course of President Nixon's visit to Peking which was going on during the hunting weekend. He said that his hosts had daily briefings on the Nixon visit at the hunting lodge. Although the Soviet leadership had obviously not yet arrived at a position on the Nixon trip to Peking, it was mentioned to Kekkonen by his hosts that the Soviets believe it is sometimes easier to deal with the United States than with the Chinese since we are more pragmatic.

6. Kekkonen commented to me that he was extremely impressed by the imagination and political courage of President Nixon evidenced by his trip to Peking and forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. These initiatives of President Nixon, said Kekkonen, have already brought a significant and positive change in the world climate which has and should continue to have important ramifications for the future of all of us.

7. As our conversation drew to a close it turned to Kekkonen's visit in 1970 to Washington,<sup>3</sup> and he commented that he had then extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit Finland. I remarked that Mrs. Nixon had at that time said to me that she would like very much to come to Finland, and President Kekkonen replied that he would be delighted to have Mrs. Nixon visit even without the President.

**Peterson**

---

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 100 and 101.



# 105. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Helsinki, August 8, 1972, 1540Z.

1227. For S/S and EUR. Subj: Finnish reaction to US diplomat's use of "Finlandization" to be raised at Secretary's level on August 9.

1. *Summary.* In his initial call on Secretary Rogers tomorrow, August 9, new Finnish Ambassador to Washington, Leo Tuominen, will ask if "Finlandization" concept reflects change in US attitude toward Finland. Foreign Ministry today called in EmbOff to register concern of Government, whose curiosity aroused by use of term by US Ambassador to FRG Hillenbrand in West German radio interview August 6. We believe Ambassador Hillenbrand's commentary is apt and no explanation is owed the Finns. *End summary.*

2. Finnish Foreign Ministry's Chief of Political Section (Tuovinen) called in EmbOff today to register the Government's "deep concern" about Ambassador to FRG Hillenbrand's use of term "Finlandization" in radio interview with West German radio on August 6 and to inquire whether statement by such a high-level diplomat implied or reflected a change in US attitude toward Finland. Tuovinen said Finns had interpreted previous policy statements, including those of President Nixon in 1970, as stressing US understanding of Finnish neutrality. Tuovinen stated that the new Finnish Ambassador to Washington, Leo Tuominen, who will make his first call on Secretary Rogers tomorrow, August 9, will be instructed to make same query of Secretary as one of topics of discussion.

3. Tuovinen commented that the Finns had become accustomed to hearing the term "Finlandization" (or *Finlandisierung* in German), which the Finns regard as uncomplimentary, from such German politicians as Franz Josef Strauss, but the fact that it had found currency with such a prominent American diplomat as the former Assistant Secretary for European Affairs is of far greater concern to the Finns.

4. Ambassador Hillenbrand's radio interview has been reported in Finland's largest daily *Helsingin Sanomat*, and has already elicited editorial comment in one paper, the small leftist Socialist *Päivän Sanomat*, which wrote: "In fact 'Finlandisierung' means independence from the military and economic policy of the USA and the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries;

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 FIN-US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Bonn.

in other words, giving up the positions of the Cold War. If the word were interpreted in this way, it would be a term of honor. But in Western language it means 'coming under the influence of the Soviet Union and, before long, becoming its satellite.' In the mouth of Hillenbrand the term is an attack against the Soviet Union and Finland and the active Finnish foreign policy which is approved by the people. It is no accident that the Ambassador in Bonn uses this word at a time when Finland has just started negotiation on diplomatic relations with the GDR. In our opinion it is high time that our country's foreign policy leaders should quickly and with determination refute the attack by the US Government against our political leaders and the Finnish people."

5. Informal English translation of the pertinent Hillenbrand remark, which was in response to interviewer's question and reportedly made in German, and relayed to the Foreign Ministry in that language, follows: "Deutschlandfunk: Mr. Ambassador, it is a general opinion—an opinion which also has been adopted by the peoples in the border countries—that a return to the Cold War is out of the question. This is a philosophy, on which matter politicians and career diplomats may wish to have their say. But, must we not reckon with the fact that we in the next phase also are bound to encounter complications. One of the major themes of discussion, on which attention has been focused to a greater or lesser extent, is the zone of reduced preparedness in Central Europe. The term applied to this is the concept of Finlandization. If this were to be brought up at the European Security Conference, it would certainly affect American interests and therewith evidently also German-American relations.

"Hillenbrand: Yes, naturally, in life—also in diplomatic life—nothing is ever self-evident or completely certain. One must always take into consideration the fact that new developments may take place, developments that may be unexpected and perhaps not always positive. This is part of the normal expectations of a diplomat. One often speaks, as you said, of the so-called Finlandization of Europe. This signifies an aspiration to achieve a form of neutralization in Europe. Evidently, it is not an objective adopted by US in our policy; and I also assume that it is not a political objective for Western Europe. What we must strengthen is our NATO alliance. In my opinion, the strength of NATO is an unquestionable prerequisite for the future development of an expanded Ostpolitik and for US policy in general directed towards Eastern Europe. This was also emphasized by Chancellor Willy Brandt almost two years ago, when he said that without a strong Western policy a strong Eastern policy could not be thought of. For this reason, I believe it to be better that we do not speak of Finlandization. In the long range, one could naturally see it as a danger. But I cannot believe that it necessarily is an unavoidable development, we shall do everything

to prevent this. I mean that to speak of Finlandization of Europe, is to speak of an improbable development."

6. Embassy officer informed Tuovinen that Embassy would inform the Department of Ambassador Tuominen's intention to bring up the matter with the Secretary and added that, in his knowledge, Hillenbrand statement did not represent a change in US policy toward Finland.

7. *Embassy comment.* Considering the nature of the interview in question, and Ambassador Hillenbrand's comment that "Finlandization" is better not spoken of, Finnish reaction seems to be disproportionately strong. However, Finns in recent years have tried to ignore the term and its semantic negation of Finland's independence. They are today, if anything, even more sensitive to such commentary since it reflects negatively on their cherished hope to establish international understanding of their neutrality, something they have been notably unsuccessful in achieving in Eastern Europe. Their immediate concern, of course, relates to their hostship of the CSCE preparatory talks.

8. In my opinion the term Finlandization, applying to a country which is not truly neutral but is in fact in many ways subject to Soviet influence, is eminently correct. We do not use the term locally for obvious reasons.

9. The Finns are not as careful in their language in speaking of the United States as their thin skin in this instance might suggest. In recent weeks President Kekkonen in an interview in a Stockholm daily said, "The American warfare in Vietnam is so inhumane that we must from the humanitarian point of view express our protest." Also, Ulf Sundquist, Minister of Education, speaking at Socialist International in Vienna, said, "The position of small countries is not automatically improved by rapprochement in great power relations. The war in Vietnam is raging with the United States continuing her persistent aggression against the Indochinese peoples. It is a shame to democratic socialism if we cannot condemn this war and point out its real cause."

10. Finland cannot expect and should not be permitted to embarrass a fine Ambassador, Hillenbrand, let alone presume to bother the Secretary with this matter. It is time these people practice what they piously preach.

**Peterson**